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1/ “Single living with kid(s).”  ER Tab 71 A-X, p. 11.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Ill-prepared to address the issues and evidence presented by Appellant
Christianne Carafano (“Carafano”), Appellees Lycos, Inc. and Metrosplash.com, Inc,
formerly known as Matchmaker.com (collectively referred to as “Matchmaker”) have
distorted important issues, ignored key evidence and obscured the context in which
this case arises. 
To determine the critical issues of invasion of privacy, newsworthiness,
offensiveness, and recklessness, the context of how true and private information
about Carafano (i.e., her home address, telephone number and living alone with her
young son) was linked to false and sexually provocative statements attributed to her,
makes all the difference.
But one searches Matchmaker’s “Statement of Facts” in vain for the slightest
inkling of the true nature of the appallingly false and disgusting sexual portrayal of
Carafano knowingly distributed over the Matchmaker.com website.
The Profile included personal facts about Carafano, including her home
address and the fact that she lived alone with her son.1/  It also included four
photographs of her along with a partial listing of her film credits.  ER Tab 70, p.68-
74.  The Profile contained a battery of false, salacious and provocative statements
about her, indicating that she was extremely promiscuous and wanted to have sex
with anyone who responded, male or female:
“Q: Have you had, or would you consider having a homosexual experience? 
A: I might be persuaded to have a homosexual experience.  ***  Q: What is your
main source for current events?  A: Playboy/Playgirl.  ***  Q: Finally, why did you
call [Matchmaker.com]?  A: Looking for a one-night stand.”  ER Tab 78, pp.11-13;
ER Tab 70, pp.28, 34, 35-36.  
2The essay portion of the Profile contained the following: “Q: Try to describe
the type of person you might be interested in meeting?  A: HARD AND
DOMINANT IN MORE WAYS THAN ONE.  MUST HAVE STRONG SEXUAL
APPETITE.  Q: Describe your personality type?  What type are you attracted to?  A:
I LIKE SORT OF BEING CONTROLLED BY A MAN IN AND OUT OF BED.  Q:
What’s the first thing others notice about you?  A: MY BEAUTY.  Q: What is sexy? 
A: A STRONG MAN WITH A DOMINATING ATTITUDE WITH A YET
CONTROLLING TOUCH.”  (Emphasis in original, ER Tab 70, pp.68-69.)
The Profile also included an e-mail address, cmla2000@Yahoo.com, to permit
others to correspond with Chase529.  Id.  Anyone sending a message to that address
received the following automatic reply:  “You think you are the right one?  Proof
it!!  [Appellant’s home address and home telephone ]”  ER Tab 71 A-X, pp.14-16.
It is understandable that Matchmaker would try to sanitize the facts of this
case and reduce it to a few general propositions, wrapped in laudatory First
Amendment principles.  But when it comes to denying Appellant a trial on the merits
over the shocking material published by Matchmaker, which caused her and her
young son so much harm, the content and context of that material cannot be ignored.
Finally, Carafano seeks no “special privacy right” or “greater privacy rights”
than anyone else, as Matchmaker argues (Appellee’s Brief (“AB”), pps 6 and 38). 
She seeks only those privacy rights, as a limited public figure, to which she is
entitled under the federal and state constitutions and statutory and common law.
II. ARGUMENT
A. CARAFANO DID NOT ABANDON ANY OF HER CLAIMS FOR
WRONGFUL DISCLOSURE OF HER TELEPHONE NUMBER
AND THE FACT THAT SHE LIVES ALONE WITH HER
YOUNG SON
Despite the fact that in her Opening Brief, Carafano cited five instances
in her Memorandum of Points and Authorities opposing summary judgment, in
2/ Appellant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities.  ER Tab 75,
pp.6:12, 8:22-24; 10:21, 11:17, 23:24-26.  Appellant’s Declaration   ER Tab
78, p.2:12-25; p.3:13-15; p.3:26-27; p.4:11-14; p.4:23-25; p.5:78; p.6:3-4;
p.7:4-5; Carafano Decl. ¶18.  Appellant’s Statement of Genuine Issues: ER
Tab 78, p.2:12-25. ER Tab 79, pp.12:15-18, 27:14-18, 31:18-21, 31:23-25.
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which she argued that Matchmaker’s disclosure of her telephone number and that she
lived alone with her son (in the context of the sexually provocative statements
attributed to her) invaded her privacy; eight such instances in her Declaration and
five such instances in her Statement of Genuine Issues,2/ Matchmaker asserts that she
“abandoned” these claims, because she supposedly offered no “argument” why a trial
was required.  Matchmaker cites Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988)
for the proposition that issues raised in an appellate brief which are not supported by
argument are deemed abandoned.  In Leer, while prison inmates based their appeal
on Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds, in their appellate brief they only
argued the Eighth Amendment issues.  Not surprisingly, the Court found that issues
raised on appeal which are not supported by argument are deemed abandoned, unless
this would result in manifest injustice, citing United States v. Loya, 807 F.2d 1483,
1486-87 (9th Cir. 1987).
Leer has nothing to do with the “abandonment” of claims in the trial court,
particularly here where the claims were raised and argued at no less than eighteen
(18) different points in the pleadings, including Carafano’s legal memorandum, her
declaration and her statement of genuine issues.
Abandonment is a serious claim.  Only an “explicit” act in the District Court
will constitute an abandonment.  United Transp. Union v. Skinner, 975 F.2d 1421,
1424-1425 (9th Cir. 1992); Coalition For a Healthy Calif. v. F.C.C., 87 F.3d 383, 386
(9th Cir. 1996).  Nothing close to an explicit abandonment occurred in this case.  An
issue is preserved, and therefore neither waived nor abandoned, when it has been
presented and the District Court has a reasonable opportunity to consider it. 
Kirshner v. Uniden Corp. Of America, 842 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1988);
Whittaker Corp. v. Execuair Corp., 953 F.2d 510, 515 (9th Cir. 1992); Simkins v.
3/ Even if a legal issue is deemed conceded or overlooked in the trial
court, it may still be considered on appeal where, as here, the pertinent record
has been fully developed below.  Scott v. Ross, 140 F.3d 1275, 1283 (9th Cir.
1998).  Fundamentally, this Court has the authority to excuse a party’s failure
to raise an issue in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice.  Wiksell v. C.I.R.,
90 F.3d 1459, 1463 (9th Cir. 1996); Roberts v. Hollandsworth, 582 F.2d 496,
499-500 (9th Cir. 1978).  Neither Appellee nor the District Court claims that
Carafano affirmatively conceded this issue.
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NevadaCare, Inc., 229 F.3d 729, 733 (9th Cir. 2000) .
Of course, the question of abandonment or waiver of an issue below is a “rule
of practice,” not a jurisdictional limitation.  This Court has discretion to consider
issues raised for the first time on appeal, Telco Leasing Inc. v. Transwestern Title
Co., 630 F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir. 1980) and may remand for the District Court to
consider an issue deemed first raised on appeal, Williams v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. Of
America, 113 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 1997).3/
Here, where Carafano’s Complaint alleged that Matchmaker invaded her
privacy by the public disclosure of her telephone number and the fact that she lives
alone with her son, as well as her home address (in the context of the salacious and
disgusting Profile), and where evidence and argument to that effect was presented
throughout her pleadings and where the pertinent record has been fully developed
below, it would be a miscarriage of justice to treat these critical claims as somehow
“abandoned”.
The consequences of finding that Carafano did not abandon these claims are
significant.  Since the District Court excused itself from addressing these claims, it
made no finding that the public disclosure of this private information was
“newsworthy” and Matchmaker nowhere in its Brief claims that a personal telephone
number is “newsworthy”, especially in the context of the salacious Profile. 
Therefore, summary judgment on these claims must be reversed.
5B. THE ISSUE OF “NEWSWORTHINESS,” INVOLVING
COMMUNITY MORES, CUSTOMS AND CONVENTIONS,
FOCUSES ON THE CONTEXT OF THE PUBLICATION AND
CONSEQUENTLY RAISES A JURY QUESTION
This Court has long held that whether a publication is “newsworthy,”
and consequently protected by the First Amendment, turns on whether the matter is
of “legitimate concern to the public.”  Virgil v. Time Inc. 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir.
1975).  Recently followed in Demarest v. Athol/Orange Cnty. TV, Inc. 188
F.Supp.2d 82 (D.Mass. 2002).  See also Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co., (1984)
154 Cal.App.3d 1040, 1048; Schulman v. Group W Productions, (1998) 18 Cal.4th
200, 223.
In Virgil, this Court adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts §652D on the
issue of “newsworthiness.”  Id. at 1130.  In determining “what is a matter of
legitimate public interest, account must be taken of the customs and conventions of
the community; and in the last analysis what is proper becomes a matter of the
community mores.  The line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the giving
of information to which the public is entitled, and becomes a morbid and sensational
prying into private lives for its own sake, with which a reasonable member of the
public, with decent standards, would say that he [or she] had no concern.”  Id. at
1129.  (Emphasis added.)
This Court drew two critical conclusions from this analysis which are
particularly relevant here:
1. The First Amendment does not confine the question of
“newsworthiness” to one of law to be decided by the judge.  Id. at 1130.  Where
“there is room for differing views as to the state of community mores or the manner
in which it would operate upon the facts in question, there is room for the jury
function.  The function of the court is to ascertain whether a jury question is
presented.”  Id. at 1130.  The determination of “newsworthiness” founded “on
community mores must be largely resolved by a jury subject to close judicial scrutiny
to ensure that the jury resolutions comport with First Amendment principles.”  Id. at
61130 n 13.
2. To decide whether a publication is sufficiently newsworthy to
immunize it from liability, the fact that the “general subject” in question may be a
matter of general public interest, does not mean that everything in the publication is
a matter of legitimate public interest.  Id. at 1131.  In Virgil, this Court asked a series
of questions to determine whether, in the context in which the matters in question
were publicized, they would “prove highly offensive to a reasonable person – one of
ordinary sensibilities.”  Id. at 1131.
Context is everything.  Yet Matchmaker has deliberately stripped the illicit
Profile of all context.  One would think that Carafano’s home address had been
innocently displayed on a Yellow Pages website or an innocuous “Map of the Star’s
Homes” (as the District Court suggested).
But that is not the context in which her home address (or her telephone
number or the fact that she lived alone with her young son) was publicized.  These
matters were publicized in the context of a false, extremely gross, salacious and
disgusting invitation to have promiscuous sex with anyone who responded, male or
female.
Whether the disclosure of Carafano’s home address (and all the rest) in that
context is “highly offensive to a reasonable person - one of ordinary sensibilities,”
taking into account “the customs and conventions of the community,” thereby
crossing the line and ceasing “to be the giving of information to which the public is
entitled” and instead becoming “a morbid and sensational prying into private lives
for its own sake, with which a reasonable member of the public, with decent
standards, would say that he [or she] had no concern,” is plainly a question for the
jury.
Under Virgil and its progeny, since there is “room for differing views,” the
best arbiter we have to measure the Profile against “community mores” and what is
“highly offensive to a reasonable person,” is a jury.
4/ ER Tab 76 Ex. 1-15, pp. 111:17-23; 113:22-114:9; ER Tab 76 Ex. 16-
21, pp. 3:2-4:6, 8:20-10:22; ER Tab 71 A-X, pp. 14-16.
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It was error, on this record, for the District Court to dispose of the issue of
“newsworthiness,” as a matter of law.  Given genuine issues of material fact,
summary judgment should have been denied.
C. THERE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT
MATCHMAKER HAD ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF FALSITY
AND OFFENSIVENESS FROM THE OUTSET.
1. Matchmaker concedes that when “a new member signs up,
Matchmaker sends an automatic ‘welcome e-mail’ to the e-mail address provided by
the member.  If a person were to reply to the ‘welcome e-mail’, it would go to the
system operator assigned to the new member’s community.”  (A.B. p.10-11, citing
ER 98:2 and ER 85:3.)
Because the unknown individual who originally set up the Profile also
provided Matchmaker with the cmla2000@Yahoo.com e-mail address,4/ in
accordance with Matchmaker’s own explanation of its system, the automatic reply
from cmla2000@Yahoo.com “would go to the system operator assigned to the new
member’s community.”
That reply stated: “You think you are the right one?  Proof it!! [Carafano’s
home address and home phone]” ER Tab 71 A-X, pp. 14-16.  Consequently, from the
very outset, Matchmaker had actual knowledge that the Profile was questionable and
violated its own terms and conditions, yet Matchmaker stubbornly continued to
circulate the Profile with knowledge of falsity and in reckless disregard of truth and
offensiveness.
Confronted with such clear and convincing evidence of “actual malice,”
sufficient by itself (and in conjunction with the other evidence of “actual malice”) to
reverse the summary judgment, Matchmaker tries to reargue the evidence by
claiming that the earliest evidence of the automatic response was November 5, 1999. 
5/ Matchmaker also claims that Carafano’s counsel “admitted” below that
whether Matchmaker received the automatic response to the “welcome
aboard” e-mail is “sheer speculation.”  Counsel did nothing of the sort.  ER
RT:12.  He pointed to evidence that the e-mail address,
cmla2000@Yahoo.com,  was set up on October 23, 1999 and that while that
didn’t necessarily mean that the auto response was there, the fact that the
automatic response was generated at least by November 5 gave rise to an
inference from which the jury could conclude that it was there from day one. 
There is a big difference between “sheer speculation” and inferences
legitimately drawn from undisputed evidence.  Triton Energy Corp. v. Square
D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1222 (9th Cir. 1995); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456 (1992).
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ER 71:[1] 14-16.5/
But summary judgment is not an occasion to argue the evidence or to ask the
court to choose between competing inferences or to rely on the interpretation of the
evidence most favorable to the moving party.   Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456, 112 S.Ct. 2072, 2077 (1992).  Instead,
the court’s responsibility begins and ends with identifying genuine issues of material
fact sufficient to go to the jury.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252,
106. S.Ct. 2505, 2512 (1986). 
It is undisputed that the cmla2000@Yahoo.com e-mail address was established
on October 23, 1999.  ER 94:3.  There is also evidence from which the jury could
find that Carafano received obscene phone calls generated by the automatic response
as early as October 31, 1999.  ER 85:79-80, 81, 82.
In any event, even using the November 5, 1999 date conceded by
Matchmaker, the evidence shows that Matchmaker had actual knowledge of falsity at
least three (3) days before the Profile was removed, and yet continued to circulate it,
resulting in over 120 additional “hits”.
2. Matchmaker also argues that Doris McConnell, the system
operator in charge of the Los Angeles Metro community in 1999, “does not recall
receiving such an e-mail.”  While her memory lapse is convenient for Matchmaker,
9self-serving statements from a defendant’s representatives are matters of credibility
for the jury, Kaelin v. Globe Communications Corp., 162 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir.
1998).  In any event, this Court has observed that since it has “yet to see a defendant
who admits to entertaining serious subjective doubts about the authenticity of an
article it published, we must be guided by circumstantial evidence.”  Eastwood v.
Natl’l Enquirer, 123 F.3d 1249, 1253 (9th Cir. 1997).
3. Matchmaker also argues that the automatic response would not
have “caused a system operator to question the authenticity of a particular profile.” 
A.B. p.31.  But this argument flies in the face of Matchmaker’s own Terms and
Conditions which prohibit the inclusion of “Telephone numbers;” “Street addresses;”
or “Offensive sexually suggestive or connotative language.”  In this case, the
automatic response contained all three.  It is for the jury, not the District Court or this
Court, to decide whether or not to believe Matchmaker’s systems operator when she
claims she had no reason to “question the authenticity of a particular profile.”
4. The undisputed evidence also establishes that Matchmaker had
actual knowledge of falsity, sufficient in and of itself to satisfy the actual malice
standard, rendering the grant of summary judgment erroneous.  Siouxan Perry
notified Matchmaker of the bogus profile on November 6, 1999 and demanded that it
be removed immediately, but Matchmaker refused.  ER Tab 76 EX 16-21, pp.18:2-
19:21.
Matchmaker attempts to excuse the impact of having deliberately continued to
distribute the Profile, resulting in at least 123 additional “hits,” with actual
knowledge of falsity, for at least two days after Carafano’s web consultant notified
Matchmaker that the Profile was a sham, by suggesting that it acted “promptly” by
waiting until the “first business day” to remove the Profile.  There is no evidence that
Matchmaker only operated on “business days.”  On the contrary, the evidence shows
that Matchmaker’s “network operations personnel” worked on weekends.  ER
76:126.  In any event, whatever a jury may think of Matchmaker’s excuse, it does not
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alter the fact that Matchmaker deliberately continued to distribute the Profile, despite
actual knowledge of falsity and offensiveness.  That alone precludes summary
judgment.
5. Matchmaker also argues that neither the receipt of the automatic
response nor the complaint by Carafano’s assistant on November 6, 1999, establish
“actual malice” at the “time of the publication.”  A.B. p. 31.  In the first place, as
noted above, the jury could reasonably conclude that Matchmaker received the
automatic response on October 23, 1999, the very first day the Profile was circulated.
The Profile was continuously circulated from October 23 until November 8 or
9.  Given the technology of the Internet, once Matchmaker was confronted with
evidence of the hoax and the questionable nature of the Profile, the continued
circulation of the Profile was done with knowledge of falsity and reckless disregard
of its falsity and offensiveness.
One who knowingly permits defamatory material (or material that invades
one’s privacy) to continue to be published after being put on notice of falsity or
offensiveness, despite a reasonable opportunity to remove it, is guilty of
republication.  Heller v. Bianco (1952) 111 Cal.App.2d 424. 
Heller is chillingly similar to the case at hand, absent the Internet.  There, an
unknown person falsely wrote on the men’s room wall at a tavern that the plaintiff
was an unchaste woman who indulged in what the court coyly called “illicit amatory
ventures.”  The graffiti included the plaintiff’s home telephone and the notation “ask
for Isabelle,” (her real first name).  A married woman, she was shocked and appalled
to receive a call from a perfect stranger on her home telephone.  The man told her
where he had gotten her number.  When the plaintiff’s husband immediately called
the tavern and demanded the words be removed from the men’s room wall, the
bartender refused, saying he was too busy and would remove it when he got around
to it.  The husband, the police and several people went to the bar and discovered that
the libelous matter was still on the wall.
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The Court held, in words as relevant to the Internet today as they were to a
men’s room wall fifty years ago, that “[p]ersons who invite the public to their
premises owe a duty to others not to knowingly permit their walls to be occupied
with defamatory matter.”  Id.  111 Cal.App.2d at 426.  “The theory is that by
knowingly permitting such matter after reasonable opportunity to remove the same
the owner of the wall or his lessee is guilty of republication of the libel.”  Id.
In response to the defendant’s claim, echoed here by Matchmaker, that “there
is no proof that they knew of the existence of the libelous matter and therefore that
[plaintiff] failed to make proof sufficient to warrant submission of her cause to the
jury for its determination,” the Court disagreed.  It held that “[r]epublication occurs
when the proprietor has knowledge of the defamatory matter and allows it to remain
after a reasonable opportunity to remove it.”  Id. at 427.
Likewise here, republication occurred when Matchmaker had knowledge of
the defamatory matter, as a result of the automatic e-mail response (as early as
October 23, 1998) and the call from Carafano’s web consultant (on November 6,
1998), and still allowed it to remain despite a reasonable opportunity to remove it. 
The decision in Hellar v. Bianco, recently cited with approval in Live Oak
Publishing Company Inc. v. Gladys Cohagan, (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1277, 1284,
establishes that a jury may find Matchmaker liable for allowing the defamatory and
invasive Profile to remain, despite being put on notice and despite a reasonable
opportunity to remove it.
D. “ACTUAL MALICE” MAY BE ESTABLISHED BY
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND EVIDENCE OF
NEGLIGENCE, SO LONG AS IT DOES STAND ALONE.
Matchmaker urges this Court to judge the question of “actual malice” by
ignoring any circumstantial evidence or evidence of negligence.  But that is the
wrong legal standard.  While evidence of negligence alone cannot support a finding
of “actual malice,” evidence of negligence and circumstantial evidence may be used
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in conjunction with other more direct evidence to prove “actual malice,” or here, to
create genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment.
In St.  Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968), the Supreme Court held that
(“[t]here must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in
fact entertained serious doubt as to the truth of his publication.  Publishing with such
doubts shows reckless disregard for the truth or falsity and demonstrates actual
malice.”  Id. at 731.); Harte-Hankes Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S.
657, 658 (1989), (while a “showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an
extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily
adhered to by responsible publishers cannot alone support a verdict in favor of a
public figure plaintiff in a libel action,” (emphasis added) a newspaper’s choice not
to interview the one witness who was most likely to confirm the instigator’s account
of events is evidence that the paper had serious doubts about the accusations because
that one witness’ denial of the statements would end the story.” Id. at 683.)
Here, Matchmaker turned a blind eye to the text of the profiles it was
publishing, despite its subjective awareness of the harm resulting from the
publication of one’s home address.  Such “purposeful avoidance” is clearly some
evidence of reckless disregard.
In Antonovich v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 234 Cal.App.3d 1041,
1047, 1049 (1991), the court denied summary judgment and held that a trier of fact
could draw an inference of actual malice from the fact that there was circumstantial
evidence alerting defendant to the probable falsity of his statements against plaintiff
placing him on inquiry notice after the initial statement was made, and by the fact
that defendant thereafter continued publication without ascertaining the truth of the
matter.   Here, given the automatic response to its “welcome” email, Matchmaker
was alerted to the probable falsity of the Profile and worse yet when actually told by
Appellant’s web consultant that the Profile was bogus, Matchmaker failed and
refused for 2 ½ more days to remove it, exposing Appellant to the danger of further
6/ In Reader’s Digest Assn., Inc. v. The Superior Court of Marin County, (1984)
37 Cal.3d 244, 252,  the court noted that “As St. Amant’s, supra, at 727, 732,
examples suggest, actual malice can be proved by circumstantial evidence of
negligence, of motive and of intent [which] may be adduced for the purpose of
establishing, by cumulation and by appropriate inferences, the fact of a defendant’s
recklessness or of his knowledge of falsity.”   Id. at 257.  
7/ See also Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 329 (2nd Cir. 1969), (the court
found that circumstantial evidence of actual malice existed thereby precluding
summary judgment); Schiavone Construction Co. v. Time Inc., 847 F.2d 1069, 1073
(3rd Cir. 1988) (the court  noted that the determination of falsity depends in large part
on the “sting” of the article, which is a question for the jury) Westmoreland v. CBS
(continued...)
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embarrassment, harassment or worse.6/
The court in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 692 F.2d 189
(1st Cir.1982), held that “The subjective determination of whether a defendant in fact
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statement may be proved by
inference, as it would be rare for a defendant to admit such doubts … A court
typically will infer actual malice from objective facts … These facts should provide
evidence of negligence, motive, and intent such that an accumulation of the evidence
and appropriate inferences supports the existence of actual malice.” 
Awareness that information would have a serious impact on a plaintiff’s
reputation and knowledge of the harm likely to follow publication of a false story is
relevant to whether it was published with actual malice.  See Curtis Publishing Co.
v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).  Here, its own prohibition on the publication of home
addresses and telephone numbers and the fact that it kept such information about its
members confidential, shows that Matchmaker was well aware that the disclosure of
such information would have a serious and harmful impact.
Under certain circumstances, evidence of a refusal to retract a statement after
it has been demonstrated to be false is relevant in showing recklessness at the time
the statement was published.7/  Here, there is undisputed evidence that after
(...continued)
Inc., 596 F.Supp. 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)  “Whether the broadcast conveys a false
message and if so whether the false presentation was either deliberate or reckless are
questions appropriately submitted to a jury.” ) Id. at 1177.  
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Appellant’s web consultant alerted Matchmaker to the bogus Profile and demanded
that it be removed, Matchmaker failed and refused to do so for 2 ½ critical days
while another 123 “hits” accessed the shockingly embarrassing material in the
Profile.
Plainly, the District Court exceeded its circumscribed role on a motion for
summary judgment by going from issue-finding to issue-resolution.  United States v.
One Tintoretto Painting, 691 F2d 602 (2nd Cir. 1982).  Once Appellant presented
admissible evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer “reckless disregard,” it
was not up to the Court to weigh that evidence against Matchmaker’s denials and
choose sides.
E. CARAFANO’S MISAPPROPRIATION CLAIM BASED ON THE
UNAUTHORIZED USE OF HER PHOTOGRAPHS FOR
COMMERCIAL PURPOSES SHOULD GO TO TRIAL
1. The Use of Carafano’s Photographs Constituted Commercial
Speech
This Court held in Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 255 F.3d
1180, 1185 (9th Cir. 2001), and reaffirmed in Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265
F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001), that the “actual malice” standard does not apply to
commercial speech.  
In her second cause of action, Carafano alleged that the unauthorized use of
her photographs on the Matchmaker.com website constituted a misappropriation of
her likeness for commercial purposes.  In a vain attempt to evade the combined
impact of Hoffman and Downing, Matchmaker repeatedly mischaracterizes this claim
8/ “The District Court found that the Chase529 profile was not commercial
speech. . .”  (A.B. p. 49); “. . .Matchmaker’s profiles. . . (A.B. p.49); “. .
.Chase529 profile. . .” (A.B. p.49); “. . .the profiles posted on Matchmaker. . .”
(A.B. p.50); “. . .Matchmaker profiles. . .” (A.B. p.50); and “. . .the profiles
posted on Matchmaker. . .” (A.B. p.51).
15
as based on the Profile,8/ when in fact it is based exclusively on her photographs.
Matchmaker’s business is dependent on enticing trial members to become
paying members through access to profiles and photographs.  Matchmaker sells
memberships to customers to stay in business.  ER Tab 76 Ex. 1-15, p.131:5-13. 
Matchmaker’s use of the Profile was far more akin to the unauthorized use of the
Hawaiian surfer photographs in Abercrombie & Fitch’s catalog than to Los Angeles
Magazine’s use of Dustin Hoffman’s image.  Downing at 102 n2 (in overturning
summary judgment against plaintiff, court finds “use more commercial in nature”
than in Hoffman where magazine “was unconnected to and received no consideration
from the [gown] designer”).
Consequently, given the commercial use of Carafano’s photographs, under
Downing, the “actual malice” standard does not apply.
2. If and To the Extent, Carafano Is Required to Prove Actual
Malice, She Has Raised Genuine Issues of Material Fact
Entitling Her To Go To Trial
For all the reasons set forth above, Carafano has already raised
genuine issues of material fact on the issue of actual malice entitling her to go to trial
on all her claims, including this one.  Furthermore, when it comes to this claim, there
is additional evidence of actual malice.
It is undisputed that Matchmaker screens all photographs before they are
posted.  ER Tab 70, p.7:12-8:2.  As Matchmaker itself puts it, when “a member
submits photographs for his or her profile, the photographs are routed to the system
operator assigned to that member’s community.  The system operator then reviews
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the photographs before they are included in the Matchmaker database and eliminates
all photographs that violate Matchmaker’s standards.”  (A.B., 10, citing ER 98:5 and
70:7-8.)
Regardless of the fact that the parties disagree over whether Carafano is an all-
purpose or limited public figure, everyone agrees that she is a successful actress who
works in television, motion pictures, and live theater, with a worldwide following
and fan clubs in eleven countries, whose “break-out” role was Leeta the D’abo Girl
on Star Trek: Deep Space Nine, the number one syndicated television show in the
world.
Consequently, in addition to the other evidence of reckless disregard,
Matchmaker will have to explain to the jury why their systems operator did not
recognize the photographs of a “world famous” actress, with a home address in Los
Angeles, yet the person who posted them used a computer terminal in Europe.
3. No Other Grounds Exist For Dismissing Carafano’s
Misappropriation Claim
The only grounds asserted by Matchmaker (and found by the District
Court) to dismiss Carafano’s claim for misappropriation of her photographs for
commercial purposes was that she failed to prove actual malice.  Since that ruling
was erroneous, summary judgment on this claim must be reversed and Carafano is
entitled to go to trial.
F. MATCHMAKER, HAVING CREATED AND DEVELOPED, IN
WHOLE OR IN PART THE USER PROFILES, IS NOT IMMUNE
UNDER SECTION 230 
An Interactive Computer Service (“ICS”) like Matchmaker can be held liable
for the creation and/or development, in whole or in part, of Internet content.  See
Blumenthal v. Drudge and America Online, Inc., 922 F.Supp.44 (D.C. Dist. 1998) at
50; Ben Ezra, Weinstein and Company, Inc. v. America Online Inc , 206 F.3d 980
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(10th Cir. 2000) FN4.  Section 230 does not immunize an Internet Content Provider
(“ICP”) from liability for information it develops or creates, in whole or in part.  Id. 
Matchmaker and Amici Curiae cite Gentry v. eBay, Inc., (2002) 99
Cal.App.4th 816 to support their argument that the District Court erred by
concluding that Matchmaker forfeited its statutory immunity by giving its users a
question-and-answer method for structuring the information contained in the dating
service profiles through extensive multiple choice and essay questions which were
required to generate the profiles.  Gentry is distinguishable from the case at bar
because Gentry merely involved a method for eBay customers to rate sales
transactions with the dealers as “positive”, “negative” or “neutral”.  Id. at 834.  In
practice, the Feedback Forum allowed anyone to rate a dealer, even if there had
never been a sales transaction between the parties, leading to most, if not all, positive
feedback ratings as self-generated or as provided by other dealers.   eBay
automatically added color-coded stars next to user’s names based solely on the
number of “positive feedbacks” each user received.  Id.  eBay also offered a Power
Sellers Endorsement which was given to select eBay dealers automatically based
upon the volume of sales and positive feedback ratings.  Id.  Given these objective
statistical indicators, the court found that eBay did not create or develop content
sufficient to transform it into an ICP.
In the present case, however, the facts are entirely different.  Matchmaker
provides approximately 62 detailed multiple choice questions, each with a set of pre-
prepared responses, that are created by Matchmaker, seeking personal information
about each user.  Examples of the questions and the choice of responses created by
Matchmaker include: [Excerpts Tab 70, Exhibit A]
QUESTION MATCHMAKER PRE-PREPARED 
RESPONSES 
Your current living situation is? Happily married; Not-so-happily Married;
Married and we swing; Divorced living alone
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Of this list, what is your favorite
OUTDOOR activity? 
... Girl/Boy watching...
Of this list, what is your favorite
INDOOR activity? 
... Hot tubbing; Bar Hopping...
Do you drink?  I do not drink; I drink socially; I drink daily; I
drink like a fish
Do you smoke?  I do not smoke; I smoke in moderation; I
smoke like a chimney; I occasionally get high; I
get high daily; I never come down; I’m kicking
the habit
Have you had, or would you
consider having a homosexual
experience?  
Homosexuality repulses me; I have never
considered a homosexual experience; I might
be persuaded to have a homosexual experience;
I have had many homosexual experiences; Of
course, silly
I have: Very good looks; Above average looks;
Average looks; Less than average looks; Bring
your bag
Is religion a part of your life?  Religion is a large part of my life; I am
moderately religious; Religion is not a part of
my life; Satan laughs
Are you happy with the fame
and fortune in your life?
I don’t have many of the things I really want;
I’m just about where I want to be; I want a bit
more, but I have everything I need; I have plans
to take more control of my life; I will set the
world on fire with what I plan to do; What? Me
worry?
 Would you consider meeting
someone from this system?  
 I'll meet anyone, anywhere, anytime for any
reason; I'd make a date with someone
interesting; I'd meet someone at a party or club;
A clandestine rendezvous might be fun; I'm not
"available" but I might do lunch; It's unlikely
that I'd meet someone from here; Pen-pals is
the limit for me; I'm never going to meet
anyone (ever again!)
What style of dress do you
prefer?  
... I dress for the occasion; What ever is clean;
Preppy; Punk; Nude...
I would rather watch a movie: ... At the drive in; In a booth with lotsa
quarters...
What is your main source of
current events?  
... National Enquirer; Playboy/Playgirl...
What type of movie do you like
best?  
... Pornographic; Adventure...
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Finally, why did you call?  Hoping to start a relationship; seeking an
occasional lover; Hunting for a roommate;
Scouting out for swinging couples; Looking for
a pen pal only; Just looking; Curious; A friend
put me up to this; Looking for a one-night-
stand; I found the number on a bathroom wall; I
don't know and I won't call back
Matchmaker also provides eighteen (18) detailed essay questions to develop
the content of the user's profile.  A user must complete at least three of these
questions or else Matchmaker require the user to fill out the questionnaire again.  
Examples include: [Excerpts Tab 70, Exhibit A] 
• Have you ever accomplished anything that got your name on
television, radio, in a magazine or newspaper?  What was it you
did?
• What would someone notice first about you?
• Share about your spiritual life in terms of its depth, your
involvement, and your goals
• Where were you born?  What is your ethnic origin or ancestry? 
List some of the places you have lived or traveled.
• What would be the perfect 1st date?  Where would you go?
Clearly, these detailed essay questions are designed to develop the content of
the user's profile in a way that Matchmaker believes will better serve its goals of
attracting subscribers and making compatible matches of users.  This is quite
different from the third-party “positive”, “negative” and “neutral” ratings of sales
transactions involved in Gentry.
Matchmaker and Amici Curiae also cite Ben Ezra, Weinstein, and Company,
Inc. v. America Online Incorporated 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000) to support their
argument that the District Court erred.  But Ben Ezra is also distinguishable because
defendant America Online (“AOL”) hired third parties to provide the content,
namely stock quote information, and the plaintiff presented no evidence showing that
AOL participated in any way in the creation or development of the stock information
at issue.  Id. at 985-6.  In fact, the contract AOL had with the third party content
provider specifically stated that “AOL may not modify, revise or change” the
information provided.  Id. at 986.  AOL’s only involvement was to report errors to
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the third party content providers and to delete incorrect information brought to its
attention.  Id. at 985-6.  The court found there was no evidence to suggest that AOL
was responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation and development of information
published in its Quotes and Portfolios section.  Id. at 986.
In the present case, Matchmaker provides the questionnaire that shapes the
entire content of each user's profile.  There is ample evidence showing the
Matchmaker’s involvement, including the numerous multiple choice questions with
responses created by Matchmaker, the detailed essay questions created by
Matchmaker which mold the content of the user responses, Matchmaker's review of
photographs prior to posting, and the “welcome email” which allows the user and
Matchmaker to be informed of potentially offensive content and suspected misuse. 
This is quite different from hiring a third party to prepare content and providing no
input whatsoever, as was the case with Ben Ezra.
Finally, Amicus Curiae cites Blumenthal v. Drudge and America Online, Inc.
992 F.Supp. 44 (D.C. Dist. 1998).  Blumenthal is also distinguishable because the
evidence showed that all AOL did was publish Matt Drudge’s column without doing
anything whatsoever to edit, verify or even read it and that no person, other than
Drudge himself, edited, checked verified, or supervised the information in the
“Drudge Report.”  Id. at 49-50.  Therefore, the court found that AOL was not a
content provider in that case.
Blumenthal differs substantially from the present case because in Blumenthal,
AOL did not provide questions for Drudge to answer or a format for him to follow,
nor did AOL box him into a specific set of responses, such as Matchmaker did with
the multiple choice questions.  Drudge was free to write his columns as he wished
and post them on AOL, without any restrictions other than AOL’s reservation of
right to remove them, which there was no evidence AOL ever did.  
Nothing contained in the CDA immunizes an ICP which is responsible “in
whole or in part” for either the “creation” or “development” of the information
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provided through the Internet.  Each term in a statute must be given meaning and
cannot be ignored.   Connecticut National Bank v. Germaine, 503 U.S. 249, 254
(1992).
To be liable, an ICP need not be solely and exclusively responsible for the
creation of the information.  It need only be responsible, “in whole or in part.”  And
the ICP need not have created all the information, it may only have “developed” it,
again, “in whole or in part.”  The statute plainly contemplates liability for one that
“develops” information, as well as one who “creates” it.  In this case, Matchmaker
was actively and deliberately involved in both the creation and development of
information provided through the Internet.
One could easily imagine an Internet dating service in which an ICS was a
mere conduit, passively posting profiles entirely created and developed by the users,
without the ICS playing any role whatsoever, in whole or in part, in any creation or
development, doing nothing more than serving as the common carrier to post the
profiles written entirely by users.  In such a case, which is comparable to all of the
cases cited by Matchmaker and Amici, the immunity provided in Section 230 would
properly attach, thereby advancing the high ideals of the CDA in promoting “the
continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and
other interactive media.”
The present case is a far cry from such a passive “common carrier.”  Instead of
electing to serve as the mere conduit for profiles created entirely by users,
Matchmaker actively insinuated itself into the creation and development of the
information provided.  As far as the 62 multiple choice questions are concerned, it
was Matchmaker which created all of the content, the questions and the answers. 
Indeed, Matchmaker was the active creator, while the users ironically served a more
passive role in choosing from the prepackaged information already created by
Matchmaker.
As far as the 18 essay questions are concerned, Matchmaker plainly
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“developed” the information provided by the users.  Matchmaker created the outline
and specific subjects to be covered.  The essay questions shaped the topics and issues
on which users would comment.  This is precisely what is meant by the
“development” of information, for purposes of the CDA.
All told, it is clear that Matchmaker, in whole or in part, created and
developed the information provided by the user profiles and is not immune by reason
of Section 230.
III. CONCLUSION
For each of these reasons and those fully set forth in Appellant’s Opening
Brief, Carafano is entitled to her day in court and the decision granting summary
judgment should be reversed.
DATED: August 25, 2003 Respectfully submitted,
ROHDE & VICTOROFF
STEPHEN F. ROHDE
MICHELE M. BERENCSI
By:                                                      
STEPHEN F. ROHDE, ESQ.
23
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE PURSUANT TO
FED. R. APP. 32(a)(7)C) AND CIRCUIT RULE 32-1
FOR CASE NUMBER 02-55658
Pursuant to Fed.R.App.P.32 (a)(7)(C) and Ninth Circuit Rule 32-1, I certify
that Appellant’s Reply Brief is proportionately spaced, has a typeface of 14 points or
more and contains 6,974 words.
DATED this 10th day of February, 2003
By:                                                         
Stephen F. Rohde, Esq.
Rohde & Victoroff
1880 Century Park East, Suite 411
Los Angeles, California 90067
Attorneys for Appellant
CHRISTIANNE CARAFANO
24
PROOF OF SERVICE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA )
) ss.
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES )
I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California.  I am over
the age of 18 and not a party to the within action; my business address is 1880
Century Park East, Suite 411, Los Angeles, California 90067.
On August 25, 2003, I served the document(s) described as APPELLANT’S
REPLY BRIEF on the interested parties in this action by placing true copies thereof
in sealed envelopes addressed as follows:
Timothy L. Alger, Esq.
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart Oliver & Hedges, LLP
865 South Figueroa Street, 10th Floor
Los Angeles, California 90017-2543
     BY MAIL:  I deposited such envelope in the mail box at Los Angeles,
California.  The envelope was mailed with postage thereon fully prepaid.
      BY PERSONAL SERVICE: I delivered such envelope by hand to the
residence/office of the addressee.
     BY FACSIMILE: I personally sent the documents via facsimile machine to the
addressee(s)’s facsimile number(s) designated above.
  X  BY FEDERAL EXPRESS: In accordance with F.R.A.P. 25(c), I deposited the
documents with the above address in such Federal Express envelope in the
Federal Express pick up box at Los Angeles, California.  The envelope was
FedEx’d per our Customer Account payment system.
     STATE Court:
 X FEDERAL Court:
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that
the above is true and correct.
Executed on August 25, 2003 at Los Angeles, California.
                                                            
PATRICIA ANN LEWIS
iTABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
A. CARAFANO DID NOT ABANDON ANY OF HER CLAIMS
RELATING TO THE WRONGFUL DISCLOSURE OF HER
TELEPHONE NUMBER AND THE FACT THAT SHE LIVES
ALONE WITH HER YOUNG SON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
B. THE ISSUE OF “NEWSWORTHINESS,” INVOLVING
COMMUNITY MORES, CUSTOMS AND CONVENTIONS,
FOCUSES ON THE CONTEXT OF THE PUBLICATION
AND CONSEQUENTLY RAISES A JURY QUESTION . . . . . . . . 5
C. THERE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT
MATCHMAKER HAD ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF
FALSITY AND OFFENSIVENESS FROM THE OUTSET . . . . . . 7
D. “ACTUAL MALICE” MAY BE ESTABLISHED BY
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND EVIDENCE OF
NEGLIGENCE, SO LONG AS IT DOES STAND ALONE . . . . . 11
E. CARAFANO’S MISAPPROPRIATION CLAIM BASED
ON THE UNAUTHORIZED USE OF HER PHOTOGRAPHS
FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES SHOULD GO TO TRIAL . . 14
1. The Use of Carafano’s Photographs Constituted
Commercial Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2. If and To the Extent, Carafano Is Required to Prove
Actual Malice, She Has Raised Genuine Issues of 
 Material Fact Entitling Her To Go To Trial . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3. No Other Grounds Exist For Dismissing Carafano’s
Misappropriation Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
F. MATCHMAKER, HAVING CREATED AND DEVELOPED,
IN WHOLE OR IN PART THE USER PROFILES, IS NOT 
IMMUNE UNDER SECTION 230 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
III. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Pages
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
Antonovich v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County
234 Cal.App.3d 1041 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Ben Ezrq, Weinstein and Company, Inc. v. America Online Inc.
206 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 17, 19, 20
Blumenthal v. Drudge and America Online Inc.
922 F.Supp.44 (D.C. Dist. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 20 
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States
692 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Coalition For A Healthy Calif. v. F.C.C.
87 F.3d 383, 386 (9th Cir. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Connecticut National Bank v. Germaine
503 U.S. 249 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts
388 U.S. 130 (1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Demarest v. Athol/Orange Cnty. TV, Inc.
188 F.Supp.2d 82 (D. Mass.2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch
265 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 15
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.
504 U.S. 451 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Eastwood v. Nat’l Enquirer
123 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 14
Gentry v. eBay, Inc.
(2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 816 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17, 19
Goldwater v. Ginzburg
414 F.2d 324 (2nd Cir. 1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Harte Hankes Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton
491 U.S. 657 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Heller v. Bianco
(1952) 111 Cal.App.2d 424 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 11
Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc.
255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
iii
Kaelin v. Globe Communications Corp.
162 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 14
Kirshner v. Uniden Corp. Of America
842 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Leer v. Murphy
844 F.2d 628 (9th Cir. 1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Live Oak Publishing Company Inc. v. Gladys Cohagan
(1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1277 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Reader’s Digest Assn., Inc. v. The Superior Court of Marin County
(1984) 37 Cal.3d 244 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Roberts v. Hollandsworth
582 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Schiavone Construction Co. v. Time Inc.
847 F.2d 1069 (3rd Cir. 1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Schulman v. Group W Productions
(1998) 18 Cal.4TH 200 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Scott v. Ross
140 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Simkins v. NevadaCare, Inc.
229 F.3d 729 (9th Cir. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. 4
Sipple Chronicle Publishing Co.
(1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 1040 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
St. Amant v. Thompson
390 U.S. 727 (1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 13
Telco Leasing Inc. v. Transwestern Title Co.
630 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co.
68 F3d 1216 (9th Cir. 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
United States v. Loya
807 F.2d 1483 (9th Cir. 1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
United States v. One Tintoretto Painting
691 F2d 602 (2nd Cir. 1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
United Transp. Union v. Skinner
975 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Virgil v. Time, Inc.
527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 6
Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc.
596 F.Supp. 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13, 14
iv
Wiksell v. C.I.R.
90 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Williams v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. Of America
113 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Whittaker Corp. v. Execuair Corp.
953 F.2d 510 (9th Cir. 1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
SECONDARY AUTHORITIES
Restatement (Second) of Torts §652D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 6
